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Abstract 
 
In this paper, I analyze the Survey of Participation of Adult Population in 
Learning Activities, a uniquely detailed dataset on participation in, spending on 
and financing of educational activities by the Spanish working-age population. I 
develop a theoretical model to study the choice to participate in training 
programs, and which course to choose, given the alternative of a subsidized 
course. Determinants of participation in different types of courses are estimated, 
with education, labor status and computer skills playing critical roles. The 
expenditure in those courses is also studied. Finally, I exploit variation at the 
regional and sectorial level by using data on the previous wave of the same 
survey to test for Becker's human capital investment hypothesis: the positive 
relationship between financing on training by firms and their level of specificity; 
the positive correlation with the length of employee contracts; and the negative 
one with turnover. I only find statistically robust support for the first. 
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 1 Introduction
Human capital is a topic that has received increasing interest in the last few decades
of economic research. From the Mincer equations to its inclusion in macroeconomic
dynamic general stochastic equilibrium models (Heckman 1998), understanding the
role of human capital on economic growth and social development has emerged as one
of the mainstream questions economists face. However, we still have a long road ahead
in answering these questions. One of the primary measures of human capital used
in most models is years of education, but human capital is a much broader concept.
As articulated by Acemoglu and Autor (2009) "human capital corresponds to any
stock of knowledge or characteristics the worker has (either innate or acquired) that
contributes to his or her productivity". All investments made by workers, including
on-the-job training, and further educational activities are part of the human capital
stock, yet the understanding by economists of this process is even less clear.
Declaring 1996 as the "European year of lifelong earning", the European Union
increased its attention to the topic of lifelong learning over the last twenty years.
Lifelong learning was included in the conclusions of the Lisbon European Council
that took place in the year 2000 as a key element for Europe to achieve a more
competitive and dynamic economy. As a consequence, Eurostat proposed the creation
of an European system of statistics about the education of the adult population. As
a result, this system created three surveys, one of them being the Adult Education
Survey. In this paper, I will study the Spanish version of the Adult Education Survey,
the Survey of Participation of Adult Population in Learning Activities (EADA). This
dataset is unique in its level of detail on educational activities taken by adults, the
characteristics of those activities, and their ￿nancing. Furthermore, its last wave,
dating from the last quarter of 2011 o￿ers the possibility of an analysis of very recent
data.
One of the main shortcomings in the human capital ￿eld is that economists still
understand very little about the channels through which economic behavior shapes
decisions regarding investment in human capital. One of the reasons is that most of
the data in human capital is centered around formal education during the ￿rst stages
of an individual’s life. There are a lack of precise and detailed microeconomic data
on educational choices, especially among adults. Even when these data do exist, the
standard literature has usually treated all courses as homogeneous training activities
2(Pischke 2001, Sieben 2007, Sutherland 2010, Byrne and O’Connel 2010). To my
knowledge, there is no piece of economic literature that analyzes decisions of human
capital at the level of detail to which I have access for this thesis. Perhaps the most
important contribution of this paper is its e￿ort to attempt to better understand
human capital investment decisions and their role on labor market participation.
With data from the EADA, I estimate determinants of participation in educational
programs, and I try to explain the variation in expenditure decisions and the ￿nancing
of courses by ￿rms. Instead of treating all lifelong learning activities equally, I take
advantage of the richness of the survey to aggregate the di￿erent types of courses in six
more homogeneous groups, and estimate a model of decision of participation in each
group of courses as a di￿erent alternative. As it turns out, the e￿ect of variables such
as age or education on the probability of making an investment in human capital
di￿ers greatly depending on the type of course. Later on, I exploit variation at
the regional and sectorial level of the data to investigate the relationship between
￿nancing of the courses and the level of speci￿city of those programs, turnover rates,
and the length of contracts of workers.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. After this short introduction, I
provide a detailed description of the data I will work with in Section 2. I follow in
Section 3 with the development of a theoretical framework to think about the de-
terminants of participation in education activities. Section 4 presents the estimation
results from the reduced form choice probability equations, as well as the expenditure
in each type of course, and the results of the analysis at the aggregate level. Finally,
the main conclusions of the paper are discussed in Section 5.
2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
The main source of empirical data throughout this paper is the Survey of Participation
of Adult Population in Learning Activities (EADA). This is a cross-sectional survey
of the Spanish population that, so far, has been conducted by the National Statistics
Institute of Spain (Instituo Nacional de Estad￿stica or INE) twice: in 2007 and 2011.
3Individual analysis data
For the study of the individual level data, the analysis is focused on the latest wave
of the survey, the one carried out in the last quarter of 2011 1. It consists of a sample
of 17,829 individuals from 18 to 65 years old, and it is representative at both the
national and the regional level (at the level of Comunidades Aut￿nomas) of Spain.
Table 1: Basic Descriptive Statistics in 2011
Male Female Total
General statistics
Age 41.89 42.37 42.14
Married 56.44% 59.23% 57.88%
Education level 1.74 1.83 1.79
Household Income level 5.35 5.09 5.22
# Educational activities 0.52 0.53 0.53
Labor status statistics
Employed 63.75% 50.54% 56.94%
Unemployed 20.96% 22.45% 21.73%
Student 5.34% 5.62% 5.49%
Retiree 5.86% 2.51% 4.13%
Housekeeper 0.08% 15.49% 8.03%
Other 4.00% 3.39% 9.73%
Observations 8630 9199 17829
Some basic descriptive statistics of the sample are provided in Table 1. Due to
data restrictions, throughout the paper, both education and household income take
only discrete values. Education level is measured as a 0 to 3 variable, assigning 0
if no education; 1 if elementary education was completed; 2 if the person holds a
title of Formaci￿n Profesional or superior; and 3 to university graduates. Household
income ranks from 1 (less than 550 euros per month) to 10 (more than 3.600 euros
per month). The intervals are not exactly constant because of the way the survey is
constructed.
The average age in the data is 42 years. Note that females are slightly more
educated, but report a lower household income. With respect to their labor status,
more than half of the observations are employed, although the proportion of working
men is thirteen percentage points higher than the one of women. Additionally, more
1It is not possible to use both waves of the survey because the questions are not the same across
the two surveys, and the variables of interest for this section are only available in the 2011 wave.
4men report retired as their professional situation, while more women (15%) de￿ne
their labor status housekeepers.
The survey is structured in several blocks. In the ￿rst one, the interviewer obtains
general information about the person; such as sex, age, nationality, marital and labor
status, sector of occupation, seniority at the job or size of the ￿rm the employee
works for, if employed. Here, there is special attention in the questions about the
level of education attained by the interviewee, with an intensive level of detail on the
￿eld and degree of study (according to the Spanish educational system). The next
three sections are focused on participation in learning activities, and are detailed
below. The last two parts provide us with valuable data on the use of Information
and Communication Technologies (ICT), and on the knowledge of languages by the
interviewee.
The main point of interest for this study comes in the three next parts of the
questionnaire, where the questions are focused on the participation of the individuals
in lifelong learning activities over the prior 12 months. INE decided to divide these
educational activities in three groups: formal education, non formal education and
informal education. According to the Methodological Report of the EADA 2011,
these three main groups of learning activities are de￿ned as follows:
 Formal Education: education supplied either by schools, high-schools, univer-
sities and other formal education institutions that usually provide a full-time
continuum of education for children and young people, generally starting be-
tween 5 and 7 years old and going on until 20-25 years of age. In some countries,
the higher stages of this education continuum can be organized as programs that
combine part-time work and participation in the school and university system.
 Non Formal Education: those educational activities that are organized and
sustained over time but do not correspond with the de￿nition of Formal Ed-
ucation, such as tutoring; course-taking; activities that combine theory and
practice; training programs for a job.
 Informal Education: deliberated learning activities that are less organized and
structured. These events can happen within the family, in the workplace or in
the day to day life.
I have information on all formal, non-formal and informal activities taken by the
individuals in the sample during the last twelve months. I will focus on the so-called
5Table 2: Probability of Participation in Educational Activities by Labor Status in
2011
Formal Non Formal Informal
Employed 7.62% 40.93% 18.87%
Unemployed 8.08% 28.65% 18.69%
Student 90.80% 50.92% 28.22%
Retiree 2.17% 14.79% 11.53%
Housekeeper 1.61% 13.41% 10.54%
Total 11.72% 35.33% 18.35%
non formal educational activities. The reason to do so can be partially observed
in Table 2. In this table, for each type of educational activity, the probability of
an employed, unemployed student, retired person or housekeeper of participating in
it is displayed. Note that, on the one hand, since I want to analyze the decision of
investment in human capital of labor force participants, I cannot use formal education,
driven mainly by students (only seven per cent of workers participate in a formal
education activity, while 90% of students do so). On the other hand, according
to the de￿nition, most informal educational activities will not have the duration or
structure necessary to be considered in a human capital investment framework. Non
formal educational activities are best suited for this analysis.
It is interesting to see that 4 out of every 10 workers have participated in the
last 12 months at least once in a non formal education program. It is noticeable that
employed workers are much more likely to have attended a learning activity compared
with those who are unemployed.
The main advantage of this data set is the level of detail regarding the content,
characteristics and ￿eld of these learning activities. With this information I want to
examine, ￿rst, which individual characteristics a￿ect the probability of taking on an
educational activity. Second, given and individual’s participation in an educational
activity, I will analyze the expenditure in each course, trying to understand which
groups of individuals are more likely to realize a higher investment. Since I will be
focusing on attending an adult education program as an investment in human capital,
I will restrict the analysis to individuals who are in the labor force, either employed
or unemployed, and I therefore drop all observations of students, housekeepers or
retirees for the remainder of this analysis.
In order to learn about the decision and characteristics of the investment, I aggre-
6gate the courses into six di￿erent types: language courses, computer courses, business
related courses, low skill content courses, medium skill content courses and high skill
content courses. I do so based on the idea that the determinants of participation
di￿er in each type of program, each attracting di￿erent demands and deserving a
separate analysis.
A program is assigned to the ￿rst category if the respondent states that the ￿eld
of the non formal education activity was foreign language. Programs in computer
programming, data processing, software development and training of basic computer
and Internet skills are considered computer courses. The label of business courses
encompass educational activities on retailing, marketing, ￿nancial and investment
management, insurance, public management, work life and secretarial courses.
The characterization based on the skill content of the training program is an
attempt to organize in a parsimonious manner highly heterogeneous activities, in
such a way that the sample size is big enough to allow some statistical conclusions to
be drawn while, at the same time, the uniqueness and level of detail of the information
is not completely wasted. There are some decisions made at the margin that involve
certain degree of arbitrariness, but since the number of observations in any particular
course is rather small, those decisions are not likely to change the results.
 Low skill content: basic education programs, arithmetic and literacy, personal
development, social assistance, social work, librarian, catering, tourism, sports
and recreation, cosmetics services, hairdressing, beauty, laundry, transporta-
tion services, environmental conservation, law enforcement, ￿remen, military
training, agriculture, agronomy and gardening, forestry, ￿shing.
 Medium skill content: food and beverage industry programs, textile, materials,
mining, veterinary, education and teacher formation, painting, music, theater,
dance, graphic arts, design, craft.
 High skill content: medicine, medical services, nursery, public health, physical
rehabilitation, prosthetics, dental services, pharmacy, architecture, construc-
tion and civil engineering, mechanics and metalworking, electrical and energy
engineering, telecommunications, chemical processes, maintenance of vehicles
and aircrafts, biology, biochemistry, environmental sciences, physics, chemistry,
astronomy, geology, geography, math, statistics, law, religion, language studies
7(excluded foreign languages), history, philosophy, archeology, ethics, psychol-
ogy, sociology, political sciences, economy, journalism.
Table 3: Individual Characteristics by Type of Learning Activity in 2011
N=17.829 Age Education Income Unemployment Participation
rate rate
No course 42.11 1.67 4.94 30.5% 66.4%
Language course 39.66 2.47 6.72 17.4% 2.8%
Computer course 42.82 2.22 6.29 23.6% 4.7%
Business course 40.46 2.39 6.79 16.4% 5.5%
Low skill course 38.04 1.82 5.39 30.8% 7.1%
Medium skill course 40.73 2.15 6.17 18.2% 4.7%
High skill course 40.71 2.32 6.41 19.3% 9.9%
Total 41.52 1.84 5.36 27.6%
The information provided in Table 3 strengthens the idea that the determinants
may be di￿erent for each type of course, and provides some interesting insights. First,
workers who attend any type of courses, except for computer related ones, are usually
younger than those who do not attend any training program. Participants are more
educated and considerably wealthier, although this di￿erence is smaller for low skill
content activities. Finally, not strikingly, it is worth noting that those labor force
participants who attended a language, business or high skill learning activity during
the last 12 months have lower unemployment rates.
Table 4: Course Characteristics by Type of Learning Activity in 2011
Duration Hourly % In working % Paid by
(hours) cost hours employer
Language course 97.67 7.47 24.37% 24.90%
Computer course 71.35 18.65 38.68% 33.54%
Business course 86.57 24.03 45.67% 46.42%
Low skill course 91.52 18.58 30.32% 24.35%
Medium skill course 78.87 31.11 29.11% 29.29%
High skill course 73.98 10.06 36.91% 29.96%
Total 77.53 17.06 37.80% 34.68%
I show the descriptive statistics of Table 4 to try to get some insight on the di￿erent
characteristics of each type of activity. At least two things are worth comment: ￿rst,
8strikingly, language courses are attended, on average, by the workers with higher
income and lower unemployment rate, despite being the cheapest programs, although
the longest. Second, employers, perhaps not surprisingly, tend to subsidize business
related courses, either by directly paying for the course, or by allowing employees to
attend these activities during working time rather than their own.
Aggregate Analysis
During the last part of the paper, I aim to exploit variation at the regional-sector
level in order to focus on a more supply related approach to the o￿er of learning
activities.
To do so I construct a two period panel, based on the information provided in
the two di￿erent waves of the EADA, 2007 and 2011, and I combine this information
with other statistical sources, such as the Labor Force Participation Survey of Spain 2.
I construct a series of variables that are averages or proportions at the sector-region
level. I create 68 observations per year, that is 17 regions 3 and 4 sectors (agriculture,
construction, industry and services.).
The aim of this approach is to try to understand a little bit better the supply or
￿nancing of courses by employers to workers. Hence, it makes sense to restrict the
sample only to those who are wage earners.
From both surveys, EADA 2007 and EADA 2011, I construct several variables
that try to measure supply of courses and possible explicative causes. According to
the labor status of wage earners I measure the percentage employers, permanent and
temporal workers per region, sector and year. Basic information I have is the aver-
age age, education level and potential experience 4 within a sector and region. With
respect to adult education information, I obtain the average number of courses taken
in each cell, the percentage of them paid or subsidized by employers, and character-
istics of the programs. I include information on the number of wage earners in each
cell, as well as unemployment rates, population levels, and innovation indexes. An
important variable is the proportion of permanent workers. In Spain, these workers
are those with a permanent contract, which has no speci￿ed duration, and for whom,
2Encuesta de Poblaci￿n Activa, EPA.
3There are 17 Autonomous Communities and two Autonomous Cities, Ceuta and Melilla, so I
could have 19 regions, but Ceuta and Melilla are dropped of the sample due to small sample size
4Potential experience is de￿ned as age minus years of education.
9in case of displacement, the ￿rm would need to pay them important unemployment
bene￿ts, directly proportional to their seniority.
Descriptive statistics are provided in Table 5. Variation can be observed over
time as well as over sectors. More educated workers are concentrated in the tertiary
sector, although the average level of education has slightly increased during these
￿ve years in all sectors, with the exception of industrial workers. The ￿gures related
to the proportion of permanent workers is perhaps more striking: more than 80% of
wage earners in the industrial and service sectors work under a permanent contract,
and this proportion has increased over time in all sectors except the tertiary one,
where it is more or less constant. This can be due to the fact that, during the crisis
period, adjusts by employers were taken by laying o￿ temporal workers, and more
employed wage earners are permanent ones, in percentage terms. Half of the workers
in the agricultural sector are self-employed, while this number is much smaller for
the other sectors. It is noteworthy that the proportion of self employed workers in
the construction sector has increased from 24 to 30% in between the two waves.
Turnover rate, which is proxied by the proportion of wage earners who started
working in their current job during last or previous to last year, decreased greatly in
all sectors from 2007 to 2011, meaning that very few observations in the EADA 2011
found their job recently, consequence of the economic crisis the Spanish economy was
and is going through. It can be observed that the ICT 5 skills of workers have greatly
sharpened with the passage of time, with a similar increase in knowledge across all
sectors, preserving original di￿erences (service sector workers hold still higher ICT
skills than construction, industrial or agricultural ones). Finally, it looks like ￿rms
have slightly shrunk in size6 between 2007 and 2011.
5In both waves, a series of questions about whether respondents were able to perform same tasks
with a computer. I create the variable "Computer skill" as a discrete variable with four possible
categories: 0 if the individual does not use a computer; 1 if she is able to perform basic tasks, such as
copy and paste archives in di￿erent folders or write in a text software; 2 if her computer skills allow
her to do more complicated things (update her software or change con￿guration of the computer);
and 3 if the respondent has advanced computer skills (she is able to program, write codes, or use
macros in a calculus software).
6Firm’s size is measured as a discrete variable that takes the value 1 if the person works in a
￿rm with less than 10 employees, 2 if it has between 11 and 19, 3 there are less than 50 workers,
and 4 if it has more than 50.
10Table 5: Descriptive Statistics Aggregate Data for 2007 and 2011
Agricultural Sector Industrial Sector Construction Services
2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011 2007 2011
Age 41.79 42.50 40.72 41.60 40.03 41.15 41.33 41.26
Education 1.49 1.60 1.69 1.65 1.40 1.44 2.02 2.09
% Permanent 64.7% 70.0% 81.6% 82.7% 64.3% 71.9% 80.4% 79.6%
% Temporal 35.3% 30.0% 18.4% 17.3% 35.7% 28.2% 19.6% 20.4%
% Employers 48.3% 48.4% 13.8% 15.5% 24.6% 30.1% 19.4% 16.6%
Turnover rate 22.0% 16.7% 17.7% 11.6% 32.6% 18.8% 19.9% 11.1%
Computer Skill 0.65 1.30 1.01 1.92 0.64 1.62 1.18 2.12
Firm’s size 2.03 2.16 2.98 2.84 2.41 2.07 2.61 2.58
3 Model
In this section of the paper I aim to develop a theoretical model that can provide a
framework to help us think about the important elements and variables that agents
or individuals take into account when deciding whether or not to undertake an in-
vestment in human capital. In this particular case, investment comes in the form
of an educational activity or course once an individual is already in the labor force,
either employed or unemployed.
It is important to remark that I will not be able to structurally estimate the
equations of this model, due to the fact that I lack information on important unob-
servables, such as income7. Instead, I will estimate reduced form choice probability
models, basing our regressors on the conclusions drawn from the model that I am
about to present.
In this framework, agents are heterogeneous in several dimensions. They di￿er in
innate ability, age, experience, education (including formal education and all courses
or training activities previously undertaken), wealth, labor status and size of the ￿rm
the individual works for. In the equations of the model, for simplicity,  will stand
for ability, educ and exp for education and experience of the worker and emp will
denote her labor status at the time.
7Although some average ￿gures of income were reported before, only one third of the sample
actually reports their income level.
11Baseline model
Agents in the labor market face a decision over whether to undertake an investment
in a human capital education activity. They maximize lifetime utility according to
the following function:
maxU(ct) =
T X
t=1
t[
1
(1 + r)t 1]log(ct) (1)
Subject to the budget constraint:
T X
t=1
ct(1 + r)
 (t 1)  (1   y)[Income(No course)] + y[Income(Course)] (2)
This budget constraint can be simpli￿ed if income from attending the educational
activity is decomposed in the following way:
Income(Course) = Income(No Course) + Profits(Course) (3)
Thus:
T X
t=1
ct(1 + r)
 (t 1)  Income(No course) + y[Profits(Course)] (4)
Where y is a dummy variable that is equal to one if an individual decides to attend
the course, and zero otherwise. Therefore, individuals face a linear maximization
problem in which the choice of attending a course only depends on whether the
lifetime expected net pro￿ts of attending a course are positive or not.
Note that according to this model, attending a course does not provide direct
utility, but just expands or reduces the budget set of individuals. I think this is a
plausible simpli￿cation for this particular study on training activities since, in there
vast majority, they are presumed to be undertaken for work related motives.
A limitation I need to overcome is that, in the data I work with I do not observe
outcomes of the educational activities. This is, I do not have access to objective
information of the pro￿ts of an attended course, either in the form of future wage data
or employment history. Hence, I model pro￿ts from attending a training program as
a function of observable variables, such as age, present employment status, education
12or experience of the individual. I do so in the following manner:
 = R(;age;exp;educ;emp)   C   (wealth)   T(;age;exp;educ;emp) (5)
This way of modeling pro￿ts tries, in a reduced form structure, to capture the
lifetime gains of attending a given course, via direct increases on wages or better
transition probabilities from employment/unemployment. Pro￿ts (or losses if they
are negative) from attending a course depend on:
 R: revenues from a course. They are a function of:
Ability: more able workers are expected to pro￿t more from attending a
course than less able ones. Revenue is increasing in ability.
Age: everything else equal, the expected lifespan to reap bene￿ts from the
investment in education is smaller for an individual of higher age. Hence, I
expect revenues to be a decreasing function of age.
Education, experience. A positive relationship between education / experi-
ence and revenues from a course is expected. I expect that more educated and
experienced individuals are able to extract a higher knowledge from a course
(for instance attending computer programming lessons will probably be more
bene￿cial for those who have a knowledge of the English language, or for those
with some background on the topic).
Labor status: depending on the course, the increase in productivity can be
higher if the individual is currently employed. This could happen if there is an
interaction in the learning ability between the course and practice on the job,
allowing the employed worker to increase more her skills than an unemployed
counterpart.
 C: monetary or face value cost of a training activity.
 : this term tries to captures the cost of ￿nancing an educational activity, or
how much a household is credit constrained. This is due to the fact that it could
be pro￿table to attend a course just based on its net present value, but due
to a lack of liquidity, it may be not possible for some individuals to obtain the
necessary funds (due to credit frictions). This cost can be thought as a function
13of the wealth level of these individuals, since those with higher levels of wealth
can ￿nance the course by themselves, usually incurring in lower ￿nancial costs.
 T: cost of time of attending the course in terms of foregone income and oppor-
tunity cost. Just like the revenue function it depends on:
Ability. People who have a higher ability also face a higher opportunity
cost due to the fact that they could employ this time in other activities of high
net value.
Age: older agents are more likely to have a higher opportunity cost, specially
in terms of foregone income. However, there could exist a non linear relationship
between age and opportunity cost, reaching its maximum at the middle part
of the working life (when workers are expected to reach its productivity peak)
and being lower at the beginning and end of it. This is something I would need
to test.
Education, experience. Those more educated and experienced typically
have higher wages as well, so the opportunity cost of attending a training pro-
gram will be higher.
Labor status. It seems plausible to assume that unemployed individuals
face a lower opportunity cost than employed ones.
Since both revenue and opportunity cost depend on the same variables, I de￿ne ^ R
as the net expected revenues from undertaking an investment in an speci￿c training
program. The ￿nal expression for net pro￿ts is the following:
 = ^ R(;age;exp;educ;emp)   C   (wealth) (6)
A few conclusions can be drawn:
 Younger individuals are expected to attend more courses than older ones, due
to the combination of two e￿ects: higher revenues and lower opportunity costs,
although a non linear relationship could be present.
 Agents with a higher level of ability, experience or education will obtain more
gross revenue from participating in a given training program (higher increase
in productivity resulting in higher wages), but will face a steeper opportunity
cost. Depending on which of these two e￿ects dominates, these characteristics
14will have a positive or negative e￿ect on the probability of investing in adult
education.
 The e￿ect of being unemployed on the participation decision is ambiguous as
well. This is due to the fact that these individuals could face lower cost of time
and greater credit constraints, but they may also obtain a lower revenue from
undertaking an investment in human capital through a training program.
 Ceteris paribus, wealthier agents are more likely to participate in a given course,
due to the fact that they face a lower ￿nancial cost.
Model with subsidized course
It is actually very common for many employed individuals to attend courses that are,
fully or at least to some extent, ￿nanced by their employees. I wish to model not
the decision by the ￿rm, but the one made by the worker when deciding whether to
attend the course o￿ered by the ￿rm, the training program that she prefers, or no
activity at all.
I use the same setup as in the baseline theoretical model, and I extend it as follows.
Agents maximize their lifetime utility according to (1) but they face a di￿erent budget
restriction:
T X
t=1
ct(1+r)
 (t 1)  Income(No course)+max[0;(Firm
0s Course);(Own Course)]
(7)
Pro￿ts from the own or preferred educational activity are modeled as before, and
pro￿ts from the ￿rm’s subsidized course are structured as follows:
^  = R(;age;exp;educ;emp) (1 (size))(C+(wealth) (1 )T(;age;exp;educ;emp)
(8)
Three new parameters are introduced:
 : degree of substitutability of the course o￿ered by the ￿rm. Belongs to the
interval [0;1]. The closer to one, the more similar are the returns between the
two courses.
 : proportion of the cost associated to the course that is paid by the employer.
15It is contained in the [0;1] interval. I model it as a function of the size of
the ￿rm. This is because, larger ￿rms are typically more committed to the
development of their sta￿. This could be due to the existence of economies of
scale in the development cost of employees. The higher delta, the lower the real
cost for the worker, and the more willing she is to take on the training program.
 : proportion of hours of the course done during working time. It also belongs
to the interval [0;1]
Now, it is an interesting exercise to compare the pro￿ts from worker’s preferred
course and ￿rm’s subsidized course, in order to understand how a change in di￿erent
parameters or variables can a￿ect the decision of participation in one activity or the
other. By comparing pro￿t equations I arrive to the following expression:
Attend own course , R(;age;exp;educ;emp) 
(size)(C + (wealth)) + T
1   
(9)
Some comparative statics might be useful:
 : a high delta moves more people to attend ￿rm’s course, because of the
decrease in cost.
 : an increase in this parameter makes ￿rm’s course more attractive because it
o￿ers more similar revenues to the one preferred by the worker.
 : if lambda is high, it is more bene￿cial to take the course o￿ered by the
employer due to the fact that the monetary subsidy is higher, and the training
is cheaper.
 Wealth: a high level of wealth implies a lower ￿nancial cost. The subsidy is
less necessary, and the ￿rst choice of the worker is more attractive because is
the one that gives her greater bene￿ts. The "discount" in the total cost of the
course o￿ered by the ￿rm is not as attractive, because the worker does not have
to face high ￿nancial costs.
 Age: older individuals have lower revenues and face higher cost of opportunity.
Ceteris paribus, they tend to attend more ￿rm’s subsidized courses.
164 Empirical Analysis
Reduced form choice probabilities
In this part of the paper, I estimate non structural choice probability equations based
on the theoretical model detailed before. The estimation strategy is presented ￿rst
and then the results.
From the model before, I have a participation rule in each training program. As
I explained in Section 2, I have aggregated the di￿erent educational activities in six
types of courses, according to its content: language, business, computer, low skill,
medium skill and high skill courses. The rationale for doing so is that I want to exploit
individual variation to identify how several observable personal qualities distinctively
a￿ect the participation decision in each type of training program.
Recall that during the estimation of reduced form choice probabilities the sample
has been restricted to take into account information only about those individuals who
belong to the labor force, either employed or unemployed. I have excluded those who
are students, retirees or in charge of domestic duties from the analysis.
I estimate a model in which agents choose between seven alternatives: participa-
tion in each of the six types of courses and non participation at all. It is important
to note that the analysis is restricted to the decision to attend one course and de-
cisions to attend more than one course are excluded and dropped from the sample.
The motivation to do so is twofold: ￿rst, the number of individuals who attend more
than one course is small8, and the second is that, if I were to do so, the number of
alternatives would escalate to levels that would complicate the task of a parsimonious
analysis.
Based on work by Butler (1982), McFadden (1986), Hausman (1978), (1984) and
Dow (2004), I propose an econometric setup on which agents decide among seven
alternatives and choose the one that provides the highest utility (the subscript i is
for individuals, and m for alternatives):
Uim = x
0
im + im for i = 1;:::;N m = 1;::;7 (10)
Prob(yim = m) = Prob(Uim = maxUij 8j 6= m) (11)
8In the original sample only 3,80% of the 17,829 observations attended two or more courses.
17If the error were to follow an exponential distribution, a simple multinomial logit
model would be estimated. In order to allow for a more complex dependence structure
among unobservables, I decompose the error allowing correlation among error terms
through a common factor model:
im = mfi + uim (12)
And uim does follow an exponential distribution. Hence, conditional on the factor,
this is a multinomial logit setup, and the probability of choosing an alternative m is
given by:
Prob(m j x;;;f) =
exp(x0
im + fim)
PM
j=1 exp(x0
ij + fij)
(13)
One alternative is chosen as the base outcome, and all coe￿cients are calculated
with respect to that alternative. I take not participating in any course as the base
outcome, because it is the more common and because the interpretation of the re-
sults is simpler this way. Then, this is estimated through MLE, where the following
loglikelihood function needs to be maximized:
L(x;;;f) =
M X
m=1
N X
i=1
1fyim = mglogProb(yim) (14)
However, the factor is not an observable variable, and numerical methods need
to be applied. I assume a distribution of the factor and approximate an integration
over this distribution with a Montecarlo simulation 9:
f  N(0;1) (15)
M X
m=1
N X
i=1
1fyim = mglog
Z
Prob(yim)dG(f) '
1
S
S X
s=1
M X
m=1
N X
i=1
1fyim = mglogProb(yim)
(16)
Now, I present the results of the estimation of the reduced form choice proba-
bilities. The same regression is run for the sample excluding those individuals who
were unemployed, but the results were mostly unchanged, so they are not reported
here. In order not to impose linearity, education and size of the ￿rm were included
9A large number of draws from the distribution of the factor are taken, and the loglikelihood
function that is maximized is calculated as the sample mean of those evaluations of the function.
18as dummy variables, allowing di￿erent e￿ects for di￿erent education levels and ￿rm
size. Since there was not a statistically signi￿cant di￿erence across them, and the
qualitative results were the same, I present only the most parsimonious speci￿cation.
The coe￿cients in Table 6 do not have a very straightforward interpretation. The
signs of the coe￿cients give us only the direction of the e￿ects of one regressor on
the likelihood of an alternative being chosen with respect to not attending any course
(the base outcome). They are silent in what the e￿ect would be between di￿erent
alternatives. For clarity, it would be helpful to be able to interpret the coe￿cients in
a more intuitive way. In Table 8 I report the marginal e￿ects at the mean. These give
us how much a discrete increase in an independent variable increases or decreases the
probability of each alternative being chosen for the average individual in our sample.
It should be noted that, although the results seem, for most alternatives, rather
small, it should be taken into account what Table 7 shows us. For instance, given
that the probability of choosing a language course is about 3%, a 1% marginal e￿ect
implies a huge increase on the overall probability of that alternative being chosen.
A detailed analysis of Table 8 gives us a few interesting insights.
The most striking results are associated with the variables of skill level in ICT
(information and communication technologies). These are three dummies that mea-
sure the e￿ect of going from "do not use a computer" to being able to perform basic,
intermediate or advance tasks. If the average individual in the sample goes from 0
to 1 in the ICT measure, this is, she learns basic computer skills, her likelihood of
not participating in any course drops by 17%, whereas it falls by 21% and 24% if
the skills learned are intermediate or advanced. This is a huge e￿ect. The likelihood
of participating in language courses increases similarly in the three dummies, in a
sizable e￿ect of over 5%, and in computer courses around 10%. Recalling that the
average person in the sample has around a 3% chance of participating in a language
course, an additional point in the scale more than doubles the likelihood of partic-
ipation in language courses. Moreover, it is interesting that only the knowledge of
advanced computer skills implies a higher probability of participating in business
training programs.
An extra year of age has a signi￿cant e￿ect on the probability of attending a
computer course: an increase of half a percentage point. This means the chances of
participating in this type of course are 20% higher than for the average person in the
sample. This is an intuitive result, in the sense that older individuals are less likely
19Table 6: Reduced Form Choice Probabilities for 2011
VARIABLES Language Computer Business Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Age 0.0676 0.156*** -0.0197 -0.102** 0.0141 0.101***
(0.0611) (0.0496) (0.0485) (0.0423) (0.0540) (0.0350)
Age square 0.000234 -0.000847** -0.000520 0.000515* 0.000638 0.000106
(0.000481) (0.000386) (0.000367) (0.000274) (0.000388) (0.000265)
Sex 0.433*** 0.216** 0.204** -0.264*** 0.229** -0.0154
(0.117) (0.0897) (0.0842) (0.0742) (0.0997) (0.0650)
Potential Experience -0.0804* -0.0569 0.0678* 0.0386 -0.0674 -0.110***
(0.0488) (0.0386) (0.0394) (0.0374) (0.0451) (0.0283)
Married -0.354*** -0.00324 0.0255 -0.197** -0.0965 -0.0178
(0.125) (0.0975) (0.0923) (0.0820) (0.109) (0.0714)
Education level 0.531*** 0.171 1.027*** 0.181 0.363** 0.406***
(0.199) (0.153) (0.158) (0.138) (0.177) (0.112)
Unemployed 0.108 0.593*** -0.151 0.409*** -0.375** 0.190*
(0.181) (0.134) (0.130) (0.103) (0.147) (0.0981)
Size ￿rm * Employed 0.144*** 0.180*** 0.0703*** 0.161*** 0.00937 0.157***
(0.0349) (0.0275) (0.0254) (0.0235) (0.0309) (0.0197)
Basic Computer Skill 2.133*** 2.779*** 0.816*** 0.403*** 0.290 0.585***
(0.496) (0.363) (0.295) (0.149) (0.227) (0.154)
Intermediate Computer Skill 2.340*** 2.930*** 1.704*** 0.511*** 0.559*** 0.882***
(0.469) (0.349) (0.240) (0.120) (0.180) (0.127)
Advanced Computer Skills 2.716*** 3.363*** 2.024*** 0.619*** 0.668*** 0.785***
(0.470) (0.349) (0.241) (0.122) (0.184) (0.130)
% Employers sector-region -1.094 -1.794** -1.287* -0.315 -0.217 -0.373
(1.017) (0.835) (0.705) (0.498) (0.641) (0.465)
% Education Firms region -0.364 30.52*** 8.641 -5.824 17.48 -11.74
(13.70) (9.975) (9.845) (8.890) (11.34) (7.863)
Constant -8.167*** -10.57*** -6.108*** -0.622 -4.713*** -5.249***
(1.144) (0.945) (0.846) (0.680) (0.906) (0.608)
Factor 0.0479 0.0340 -0.0266 -0.0188 -0.0102 0.0335
(0.0556) (0.0431) (0.0405) (0.0354) (0.0480) (0.0312)
Observations 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785 12,785
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
<
Table 7: Probabilities Description for 2011
Alternative Mean Min (predicted prob) Max (predicted prob)
No course 0.664 0.2021 0.9316
Language 0.028 0.0009 0.1315
Computer 0.047 0.001 0.2986
Business 0.055 0.0027 0.1712
Low skill 0.071 0.0184 0.2973
Medium skill 0.047 0.0096 0.1106
High skill 0.099 0.0196 0.3572
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21to have grown up acquiring these computer skills, and tend to do so via education.
Also, an extra year in age decreases the likelihood of participating in low skill courses.
Perhaps surprisingly, women seem more likely than men to participate in computer
and business related programs, ￿elds were there is evidence of a gender gap, especially
in the latter. The marginal e￿ect of the married dummy for the average person in the
sample implies a signi￿cant decreases in the probability attending a language course
(by 0.5%), and a low skill program (by 1.2%).
The role of employment and previous education is especially interesting. The e￿ect
of the unemployment dummy implies a decrease in the chances of not attending any
course by 4% and of participating in a business program by 0.7%, meaning that the
likelihood of participation in this type of learning activity is now 20% lower (which
makes sense if we recall that more than 40% of business courses were subsidized
by the employer). The marginal e￿ect for unemployment is translated then in an
increase in the probability of investment in human capital in the form of computer or
low skill courses (a marginal e￿ect of 2% implies that the likelihood of this person in
participating in a computer course almost doubles). For those in the labor market who
are employed, being in a large ￿rm greatly enhances the chances of attending almost
any type of course (except for business and medium skill programs), especially those of
high skill content. Education level is one of the main determinants of participation in
training programs. Indeed, a one level increase in the education level of the average
worker decreases the likelihood of not participating in any course by 8 percentage
points, whereas it especially increases the probability of participating in language,
business or high skill content programs.
Finally, I included two additional variables. One that tries to measure the supply
of courses in the region of the worker, as the number of ￿rms in the educational
services industry divided the total number of ￿rms in that Autonomous Community.
The other tries to capture the labor demand in the region and sector in which the
person works, as the number of employers over the total of observations in that region
and sector. The results are not too strong, but intuitive: an increase of 1 point in the
percentage of education ￿rms is associated with an increase of 1% in the probability
of taking a computer course, while it has no e￿ect on the other alternatives. The
second measure has a negative e￿ect on the likelihood of participation in training
activities, especially language programs, which can be reasonable if we think that
more employers imply higher labor demand, and workers do not need to undertake
22as many human capital investments to ￿nd a desirable match.
Expenditure equations
Now, I wish to understand the expenditure individuals undertake for each type of
course. I base this analysis on the responses on the survey to the question "During
the last 12 months, how much have you, or other member of your household, spent
on classes, registration, tuition and exams fees, books or other study materials for
this activity?". Due to the structure of the survey, this question is only answered by
a fraction of the respondents who actually attended an activity 10. Thus, the sample
size for this part of the paper is rather small. As a consequence, I do not restrict the
sample to only those on the labor force.
The purpose of this exercise is to investigate whether there exists a personal
component to the expenditure taken in each type of educational activity, although it
is clear that this cost will have a big idiosyncratic component. To do so, I construct, as
dependent variables, the hourly cost or expenditure of each type of training program,
based on the information that I have from the survey on:
Hourly Costim =
Total Expenditureim
Number of weeksim  Hours per weekim
(17)
As regressors I will use observable variables:
 Characteristics of the course: duration of the course, whether or not it leads to
a title, usefulness of its content.
 Individual observable attributes: age, whether the person is a student, educa-
tion level, literacy measures, experience, seniority, sex, unemployed and married
dummies.
 Supply side variables: measure of the unemployment rate in the region, or in
the region-sector of the worker, proportion of employers in the region-sector
cell, proportion of ￿rms belonging to the educational sector in that region.
10In the EADA 2011, the "non-formal" educational activities are structured in four di￿erent
groups: courses taught in classrooms, courses that combine practice and theory, practical activities
intended to prepare you for a job and tutoring. For all those respondents who indicate that their
course was "a practical activity intended to prepare them for a job" I do not have any kind of data
on the cost, provider or whether or not it was taken during work hours.
23Cost is only observed conditional on participation on the given course. In order to
correct for selection bias, Heckman’s Lambda is used, which is a two step procedure
introduced by Heckman (1998), which is used here in the same fashion as Bara (2008).
First, I run six bivariate probit models in which the independent variable is equal
to one if the observation attended that type of course. The choice of six bivariate
probits instead of a multinomial structure comes from the fact that I want to correct
for self-selection of the type "taking one course versus non attending that speci￿c
activity". I construct six dummy variables, that are equal to one if the individual
attended a language, business, computer, low-skill, medium-skill or high-skill course
respectively, and zero if not, and obtain the predicted probabilities of attending each
course. Second, I include as regressors in the six expenditure equations a function of
the ￿tted probabilities of attending that speci￿c training program. This function is
just the inverse Mills ratio of these probabilities.
In econometric terms, this means that the expenditure in each of the six type of
courses (C
im) can be thought of as being explained by personal characteristics and an
individual idiosyncratic component. Given that expenditure is observed conditional
on participation, the expectation of this error term ( vim) will not be zero in our
sample. Once selection bias is accounted for with Heckman’s Lambda included in
equation (20), the disturbance (im) has the usual desired properties.
C

im = zim + vim (18)
yim = 1fxim + uim  0g for m = 1;:::;M (19)
E(C

im j yim = 1;zi) = zim + E(vim j yim = 1;zi) = zim + '(xim) + im (20)
In order for this procedure to credibly correct for the selection problem, the exact
same independent variables cannot be included in both the participation and expen-
diture equations. In a manner similar to an exclusion restriction, it is necessary to
￿nd variables that a￿ect the decision of investment in each type of activity but not
its cost, or the amount invested once the person decides to participate. Optimally, I
would be looking for a variable that measured barriers of entry to education activi-
ties. That is, something that defers entry to a training program, but, once an agent
has decided to participate, this barrier does not a￿ect the expenditure/cost of the
program.
Of course, this is easier said that done. In this particular case, I have used
24dummies for the density of population of municipality in which the person lives 11. I
argue that people who live in scarcely populated areas face an entry barrier to the
adult educational system, at least to some extent. This happens because it is harder
for them to attend training activities due either to lack of supply of such programs
in a nearby facility, or, even if they exist, to the fact that it is harder to access
them. It seems plausible that living in an area with lower population does diminish
the probability of accessing educational activities. For these variables to ful￿ll the
"exclusion restriction", I need to assume that living in this type of municipalities
does not a￿ect the cost of the course, only the likelihood of participation. This is a
more restrictive assumption that relies on equal price and expenditure functions in all
areas, independent of their population. Table 9 o￿ers, at least, compelling evidence
that the average hourly cost of an educational activity does not di￿er greatly between
municipalities with high density of population and those that are scarcely populated.
Table 9: Hourly Cost by Density of Population in 2011
Hourly Cost (Euros) Mean Std Min Max Observations
Highly Populated Areas 16.3963 79.92 0.06 2000 764
Low Populated Areas 15.5457 53.63 0.10 500 211
Total 16.21 74.99 0.06 2000 975
The results of this ￿rst stage bivariate probit equations are shown in Table 11.
While on one hand it is reassuring to observe the negative sign on the coe￿cient for
the dummy for low populated municipalities on the likelihood of participation in all
type of courses, on the other hand this variable is not statistically signi￿cant for low
and medium skill content courses. This (partial) lack of power is indeed a concern
when addressing the question of how well is selection biased taken into account, but,
unfortunately, the data do not provide a better exclusion restriction. Descriptive
statistics of the predicted probabilities are reported in Table 10.
The results of this empirical exercise are shown in Table 12. Several speci￿cations
were formulated, and the one with the most explicative power is presented. A couple
of things stand out. First, the e￿ect of duration of the course in expenditure is
non linear and U-shaped (this is true for all types of courses except for business
11From the information available about the density of population in EADA 2011, I create a dummy
variable that is equal to one if the individual is living in an area of low population density and zero
otherwise.
25Table 10: Predicted Probabilities in 2011
Mean Standard Deviation Min predicted pr Max predicted prob
Language 0.027 0.026 0.0004 0.155
Computer 0.041 0.033 0.0003 0.282
Business 0.045 0.040 0.0008 0.211
Low Skill 0.067 0.038 0.012 0.292
Medium Skill 0.045 0.016 0.020 0.114
High Skill 0.089 0.062 0.017 0.360
Table 11: First Stage: Bivariate Probits 2011
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
VARIABLES Language Computer Business Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Low Populated Area -0.12** -0.073* -0.10** -0.053 0.037 -0.083**
(0.053) (0.045) (0.045) (0.035) (0.039) (0.034)
Age -0.045** 0.043** 0.011 -0.079*** 0.0047 0.026*
(0.022) (0.020) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.015)
Age square 0.00067*** -0.00015 -0.00058*** 0.00028*** 0.000030 0.000048
(0.00015) (0.00013) (0.00014) (0.00010) (0.00012) (0.00010)
Sex 0.24*** 0.11*** 0.073** -0.16*** -0.064* -0.054*
(0.044) (0.037) (0.036) (0.031) (0.034) (0.029)
Potential Experince -0.014 -0.015 0.035** 0.042*** -0.0088 -0.034**
(0.020) (0.017) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.013)
Married -0.085* -0.0010 -0.0011 -0.086** -0.010 0.0069
(0.051) (0.041) (0.041) (0.036) (0.039) (0.033)
Education Level 0.20*** -0.00085 0.39*** 0.073 0.11* 0.22***
(0.077) (0.066) (0.067) (0.058) (0.064) (0.052)
Unemployed -0.14** 0.17*** -0.027 0.17*** -0.058 0.089**
(0.064) (0.051) (0.053) (0.040) (0.047) (0.040)
Size ￿rm * Employed 0.013 0.050*** 0.033*** 0.057*** -0.0082 0.064***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.010) (0.0093) (0.011) (0.0084)
Basic Computer Skill 0.50*** 0.71*** 0.16 0.11* -0.0059 0.14**
(0.11) (0.076) (0.097) (0.062) (0.072) (0.060)
Intermediate Computer Skill 0.58*** 0.69*** 0.56*** 0.16*** 0.12** 0.26***
(0.090) (0.065) (0.068) (0.046) (0.051) (0.044)
Advanced Computer Skill 0.73*** 0.90*** 0.68*** 0.17*** 0.13** 0.18***
(0.090) (0.066) (0.068) (0.047) (0.053) (0.046)
% Employers sector-region -0.30 -0.87** -0.48 0.092 0.17 0.088
(0.39) (0.34) (0.32) (0.21) (0.22) (0.21)
% Education Firms region -4.83 11.4*** 1.99 -1.09 10.3** -3.15
(5.35) (4.31) (4.36) (3.74) (4.05) (3.46)
Constant -1.86*** -3.86*** -3.18*** 0.057 -2.28*** -2.34***
(0.35) (0.33) (0.32) (0.26) (0.29) (0.24)
Observations 17,648 17,648 17,648 17,648 17,648 17,648
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Omitted categories are: high populated area, and never used a computer
26related ones, where it seems linearly negative). This hints that very short and very
long courses are the most expensive ones, whereas the hourly cost of those in an
intermediate range are lowest. This was not an expected result but it seems like
a very robust feature across very heterogeneous ￿elds. Second, individuals living in
areas with a higher percentage of education ￿rms seem to spend more on language and
computer courses. Third, more literate individuals 12 tend to make higher investments
in language, computer and low skill courses, perhaps because they are more able to
do so. Finally, the fact of having attended other courses does not seem to increase the
level of expenditure an individual is likely to undertake, except for high skill content
activities.
Table 12: Second Stage: Expenditure Equations in 2011
VARIABLES Language Computer Business Low Skill Medium Skill High Skill
Duration -0.0703*** -0.399*** -0.219* -0.252*** -0.513* -0.0614***
(0.0213) (0.129) (0.118) (0.0593) (0.272) (0.0176)
Duration Square 7.66e-05** 0.000628*** 0.000214 0.000284*** 0.000694 6.29e-05***
(3.48e-05) (0.000228) (0.000154) (9.10e-05) (0.000453) (2.41e-05)
% Education Firms region 738.3*** 3,411** 160.5 57.38 4,317 108.9
(251.0) (1,502) (2,067) (767.6) (3,091) (230.6)
Literacy index 0.192* 1.434*** -1.183 2.918*** 0.508 -0.0108
(0.103) (0.455) (0.893) (0.596) (1.429) (0.107)
Student 6.264*** 31.87 -3.835 12.25 -15.03 -0.0233
(2.327) (19.29) (24.12) (7.793) (46.44) (2.374)
Seniority * Employed 0.00408 0.415 1.058 0.290 5.011*** 0.0999
(0.146) (0.554) (1.162) (0.544) (1.447) (0.120)
Usefulness of the course -0.873 1.623 8.075 2.094 -23.12 -2.305*
(1.268) (5.602) (8.926) (3.551) (17.15) (1.216)
# Courses attended 0.911 -1.838 -2.564 -4.605 -19.19 1.704**
(1.234) (3.973) (11.18) (6.000) (17.99) (0.815)
Heckman’s Lambda -24.89 -381.1 343.8 111.9 1,362 63.90**
(55.53) (309.9) (413.6) (108.2) (1,384) (25.10)
Observations 152 55 74 293 151 221
R-squared 0.191 0.396 0.131 0.164 0.134 0.150
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Aggregate analysis: Financing of training
During the last part of my study I will shift my focus from an individual point of
view, with a ￿avor of the demand side of courses, to a more supply related viewpoint.
12The variable called literacy index is measured as the number of books that the person claimed
they read during the previous 12 months.
27The main object of study here will be the supply of learning activities by employers to
employees, in the form of subsidized courses. The idea is to try to measure how often
employers are willing to ￿nance the courses their sta￿ attends, and what determines
that a region-sector cell o￿ers more "employer paid" courses than another.
In the human capital literature, the model presented by Becker [1962] is still
widely accepted. It provides a few hypothesis that I can test with my data:
 Employers will only be willing to pay for speci￿c training. This is due to the
fact that speci￿c skills are not transferable to other jobs, and therefore the ￿rm
has incentives to provide this kind of training programs. Becker stated that
￿rms would never pay for general training. Acemoglu (1999) showed empirical
evidence that this is not such a general statement, and that it may be optimal
for ￿rms to pay for general training if the market is not perfectly competitive.
Lazear (2009) provides a theoretical framework for why do ￿rms pay for gen-
eral training in competitive markets. However, Lazear, as well as most of the
labor economics literature, maintains the hypothesis that willingness to pay is
positively correlated with level of speci￿city of the training program.
 There should be a positive relationship between the proportion of permanent
contracts and the amount of ￿rms paying for training. This seems quite intu-
itive, if we think that ￿rms will provide training, as an investment, for those
workers that they intend to keep for a longer duration.
 There should be a negative relationship between subsidize training and turnover.
The higher the turnover rate in a region or industry, the less time workers stay
in a job, and the less time ￿rms have to reap the bene￿ts of their investment in
human capital of their workers through educational programs. Thus, the less
likely employers are to pay for training.
In order to test these hypotheses, I will use, as dependent variable a measure of
the amount of subsidized courses in a region-sector cell. In particular, the following
variable is created:
yijt =
Workers who attended a subsidized courseijt
Total number of workersijt
(21)
Where the subscript i denotes region, j sector and t year. Both subsidized and
unsubsidized courses are included in the sample in this part of the paper. As a
28measure of the duration of contracts I use the proportion of workers in a region-sector
who are employed with a permanent contract. As I stated in Section 2, turnover
rate is proxied by a variable de￿ned as the proportion of wage earners who started
working in their current job during the last two years. Finally, I need to ￿nd a way to
distinguish between general and speci￿c training. With the available data, the best
I can do is to use the motives stated by individuals to attend a course to determine
whether its content is general or speci￿c. I consider a course to be speci￿c if the
worker answers yes to either one of the following reasons for which she attended the
course:
 To perform better in the job and improve professional outcomes
 To diminish the probability of losing the current job
 Because she was forced to participate
I use the proportion of all courses in a sector-region-year cell that were taken with
any of these three reasons as motivation for participation as my measure of speci￿city
of the course.
I present the results in Tables 13 and 14. The di￿erence between the three columns
are the controls: the ￿rst column has neither time nor individual ￿xed e￿ect, the
second includes a dummy variable for the year 2011, and the third one contains both
time and sector times region ￿xed e￿ects. The third speci￿cation is the preferred one,
but since the unobserved heterogeneity in Spanish regions and sectors between 2007
and 2011 could very well not be constant, the other speci￿cations provide reassurance
of the robustness of the results. As additional controls, the percentage of wage
earners and the average education level in the cell are included in order to control
for di￿erences in both the supply and demand of labor across industries or regions
that could interfere with the willingness of ￿nancing courses by employers. Results
are robust to dropping these variables.
In the ￿rst table, the basic regression set up tests the hypothesis of Becker’s
model. I ￿nd a very strong relationship between the proportion of workers attending a
￿nanced course and the proportion of those courses that have a high level of speci￿city.
This suggests that ￿rms indeed value courses of a very speci￿c content, and are in
fact paying for them. Independently of the econometric setup, although the signs
indicate the expected direction, I ￿nd no statistically signi￿cant support for Becker’s
29Table 13: Supply Results 2007 and 2011 Data
VARIABLES
Courses paid
Workers
Courses paid
Workers
Courses paid
Workers
% Speci￿c courses 0.137*** 0.142*** 0.159***
(0.0344) (0.0338) (0.0583)
% Permanent workers 0.0233 0.0113 -0.122
(0.0485) (0.0492) (0.111)
Log(% wage earners) 0.00170 -0.000176 -0.108***
(0.00506) (0.00504) (0.0335)
Mean education level 0.0368 0.0412* 0.0855
(0.0236) (0.0234) (0.0804)
Turnover rate -0.0538 -0.104 -0.0630
(0.0782) (0.0865) (0.130)
Time FE -0.0234* -0.0420**
(0.0129) (0.0165)
Sector-Region FE NO NO YES
Observations 130 130 130
Number of Sector-Region 67 67 67
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
30Table 14: Interaction Coe￿cients Results 2007 and 2011 Data
VARIABLES
Courses paid
Workers
Courses paid
Workers
Courses paid
Workers
% Speci￿c courses 0.198*** 0.225*** 0.296***
(0.0549) (0.0563) (0.0770)
% Permanent workers 0.0407 0.0734 -0.110
(0.0585) (0.0666) (0.135)
Turnover rate -0.197** -0.171* -0.176
(0.0943) (0.0906) (0.158)
Log(% Wage earners) 0.00141 0.00107 -0.108***
(0.00514) (0.00524) (0.0321)
Average Education Level 0.0343 0.0313 0.0758
(0.0245) (0.0243) (0.0733)
% Speci￿c courses * Year 2011 -0.0830 -0.136* -0.245**
(0.0705) (0.0793) (0.0963)
% Permanent workers * Year 2011 -0.00203 -0.140 -0.00916
(0.0481) (0.162) (0.146)
Turnover rate * Year 2011 0.236 0.0494 0.159
(0.161) (0.264) (0.244)
Time FE 0.178 0.126
(0.182) (0.168)
Sector-Region FE NO NO YES
Observations 130 130 130
Number of Sector-Region 67 67 67
Clustered standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
31claims that a higher proportion of permanent workers should be positively related
with the willingness of employers to subsidize training, or that ￿nanced education
by ￿rms should be negatively correlated with turnover rate. This last result may
be driven by the fact that ￿rms operating in more competitive markets may have
an incentive to provide learning opportunities if they are seen as a work bene￿t by
workers, and these opportunities can be used to attract good employees.
In the second table, I include interactions of the main regressors with dummy
variables for the year 2011. Given the economic instability that the Spanish economy
was living in 2011 due to the economic crisis and its large impact on the labor
market, the relationship between willingness to pay for training and speci￿c courses,
permanent contracts or our proxy for turnover rate might very well have changed
over time. This could be due to many factors: fall in internal demand that makes
￿rms’ pro￿ts decrease, increase in labor supply which implies that employers can
more easily ￿nd less pricey skilled workers that are now unemployed, etc.
In this table we observe that the relationship picked up before between speci￿city
of a course and probability of being paid by employer only holds true for 2007. In
2011, the e￿ect is much smaller and, in column (3) it almost completely away. The
proportion of workers employed under a permanent contract still does not play a role
in either of the two years.
5 Conclusions
The main purpose of this paper was, to improve our understanding of the determi-
nants of investment, expenditure and ￿nancing of adult human capital using recent
individual data from Spain. I was able to work with data that had a tremendous
amount of information related to human capital investments undertaken in the year
prior to the survey. This is one of the attractive features of the paper, since, to
our knowledge, there is no previous literature that analyzes investment decisions in
educational activities at this level of detail.
I proceeded to carry out the analysis exploiting the data at the individual and
aggregate level. At the individual level, I ￿rst developed a theoretical framework to
evaluate which variables are the important to take into account when studying the
decision of investment in training programs made by participants in the labor market.
This model shows us that variables such as age, education, experience, labor status,
32wealth level, cost of the course or characteristics of the ￿rm the individual works for
can play a critical role into the decision of investment.
Despite the fact that I was unable to structurally estimate this model, its conclu-
sions were tested as reduced form choice probability equations. In these, I aggregated
the educational activities into six groups of courses: language, computer, business,
low skill, medium skill and high skill content programs. Descriptive statistics gave us
compelling evidence that their participants had di￿erent characteristics, so the e￿ect
of the critical variables could be quite heterogeneous. I showed that this was indeed
the case in the multinomial logit model with error dependence through a common
factor, in which workers choose among seven exclusive alternatives (participation in
any of the six type of courses or no participation at all) the one that maximizes their
utility.
Perhaps the most interesting result of this analysis was the importance of ICT
skills when evaluating the likelihood of a worker of participating in a training program.
Those who have some kind of computer skills have a much, much higher probability
of investing in human capital, even if those computer skills are pretty basic from
today’s point of view.
As expected, more educated individuals working for larger ￿rms had a higher
probability of participating in any type of educational activity. Married workers and
people with jobs in sectors and regions where there is more labor demand had a greater
likelihood of not attending any training program. The e￿ect of labor status was more
controversial: unemployed agents tended to participate more in educational activities,
but they did so in computer or low skill content programs, while reducing their
chances of entering in business courses. Sex and age had di￿erent e￿ects depending
on the alternative: older agents tended to participate in computer and high skill
courses, while women were more likely to attend business programs than men.
Subsequently, I moved on to examine the extent of the pecuniary investment in
each type of activity. Despite limitations of the data, in particular a small sample size,
and after correcting for selection bias, a U-shaped relationship between the duration
of the course and its cost was shown. This meant that the more expensive courses
are typically those of either very short or very long duration, which was somewhat
unexpected. It was noteworthy that more literate people tend to undertake larger
investments, and that the higher the supply of courses there was in a region, measured
as the proportion of ￿rms with educative purposes, the more agents invest in computer
33and language courses.
In the last part of this paper, I analyzed the data from an aggregate point of
view in order to test some hypothesis from Becker’s model of human capital about
￿nancing of training by employers. To do so, using data from both waves of the
EADA, I constructed a two period panel with observations at the region-industry
level, and combined this data set with statistical information from other sources. The
results showed a very robust positive and non constant over time e￿ect between the
proportion of speci￿c courses o￿ered in a region-sector cell and the percentage, of all
workers, who participated in a course at least partially ￿nanced by their employer.
I found no support for the claim that there should be a positive relation between
￿nancing and permanent contracts, or a negative one between turnover rate and
willingness of ￿rms to subsidize training.
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